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Promissory Fraud in Illinois: What is a
Scheme to Defraud?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Generally, a breach of future promise is not actionable as fraud
in Illinois.' However, in Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School,2 the
Illinois Supreme Court held that even though the general rule in
Illinois denies recovery3 for fraud based upon a false representation
of an intention to perform a promise in the future, a recognized
exception exists where the "false promise or representation of future
conduct is alleged to be the scheme employed to accomplish the
fraud.'"
But Illinois courts have not clearly defined what constitutes a
"scheme" to defraud.' This lack of clarity has hindered delineation
of a precise standard for application of the scheme exception to the
general rule. Case law has interpreted the word "scheme" both
narrowly and broadly. The broad interpretation holds that a false
promise itself is a "scheme" as long as it is a false promise with no
1. See, e.g., Gage v. Lewis, 68 Il1. 604 (1873); People ex rel. Ellis v. Healy,
128 Ill.
9, 20 N.E. 692 (1889).
2. 69 Ill.
2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977) (medical school's misrepresentations
concerning admission criteria constituted a scheme to defraud).
3. For misrepresentation to be a basis of a tort cause of action
for fraud it
must contain the following elements: (1) a false representation or omission of a
material fact; (2) knowledge of statement's untruthfulness; (3) an intent to induce
reliance; (4) reliance by the other party on the representation; and (5) resulting injury
due to reliance upon the representation. See Soules v. General Motors Corp., 79 Ill.
2d 282, 286, 402 N.E.2d 599, 601 (1980); Higgins v. Kleronomos, 121 Il.App. 3d
316, 321, 459 N.E.2d 1048, 1052 (1st Dist. 1984).
4. Steinberg, 69 Il1. 2d at 334, 371 N.E.2d at 641.
5. See, e.g., Hollymatic Corp. v. Holly Systems, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1366,
1369 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (federal court interpreting Illinois law stated that the Illinois
cases in this area "are not easily reconciled and the Illinois courts have rarely made
more than half-hearted attempts to do so"); Polelle, An Illinois Choice: Fossil Law
or an Action for PromissoryFraud?, 32 DEPAuL L. REv. 565, 578-93 (1983) (stating
Illinois' inconsistent approach to the issue of promissory fraud). The Polelle article
recognizes the narrow versus broad inconsistency under the scheme exception under
a historical approach. This writer, however, defines the narrow and broad parameters
of the "scheme" exception solely under the Pearson and Zaborowski approaches. In
particular, this writer focuses upon the evolution of the misapplication of the scheme
by Pearson and its resulting consequences if that approach is followed.
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intent to keep it, but intent for the plaintiff to rely on it.6 On the
other hand, the narrow interpretation holds that a false promise itself
with no intent to keep it is not enough, there must be more facts to
show a "scheme" to defraud. 7
The issues of whether Illinois courts should allow a cause of
action to lie for promissory fraud, as well as whether these courts
should apply the broad or narrow interpretation of the scheme
exception, are critical because they, in turn, dictate the type of
damages that will be recoverable. As a general rule punitive damages
are not compensable in suits for breach of contract. 8 The remedy, in
these instances, is to sue upon the promise. This rule does not apply,
however, in cases where the breach of contract is the equivalent to an
independent tort, and appropriate assertions of malice, wantonness,
or oppression exist.9 Therefore, if a cause of action for promissory
fraud is allowed, or the scheme exception is interpreted broadly by
Illinois courts, punitive damages will be recoverable more often.
This note will outline the development and impact this inconsistent application of the scheme exception has had on the law in Illinois.
The note will conclude with a recommended solution to this lack of
a definite and precise standard in defining a "scheme" to defraud, as
well as provide adequate guidance for application of the scheme
exception in the future.

6. See, e.g., Vance Pearson, Inc. v. Alexander, 86 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1111,
408 N.E.2d 782, 786 (4th Dist. 1980) (false promise to complete installation of truck
scales on farm plus plaintiff's reliance, constituted an intended scheme to defraud
plaintiff); Ronan v. Rittmueller, 105 Ill. App. 3d 200, 207, 434 N.E.2d 38, 43 (2d
Dist. 1982) (false promise to build plaintiff's house was deemed a scheme to defraud,
based only upon future promises made in bad faith and with deceptive intent).
7. See, e.g., Zaborowski v. Hoffman Rosner Corp. 43 Ill. App. 3d 21, 356
N.E.2d 653 (2d Dist. 1976) (false promise itself with no intent to keep it not enough);
Salisbury v. Chapman Realty, 124 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 465 N.E.2d 127 (3d Dist. 1984)
(scheme found to exist where party made various misrepresentations to various
people, rather than one broken promise); Bank of Lincolnwood v. Comdisco, Inc.,
111 Il1. App. 3d 822, 444 N.E.2d 657 (1st Dist. 1982) (false promise itself with
intention not to keep it, is not a fraudulent representation); Younger v. Revelle, 78
Ill. App. 3d 1, 397 N.E.2d 221 (5th Dist. 1979) (mere broken promise regarding
partnership agreement was not a scheme, but a broken promise).
8. St. Ann's Home for the Aged v. Daniels, 95 Ill. App. 3d 576,. 580, 420
N.E.2d 478, 481-82 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 85 Il. 2d 575 (1981) and the cases
cited therein.
9. Id. (citing Wallace v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 12 Ill. App. 3d 623, 299
N.E.2d 344 (5th Dist. 1973)).
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II.

PROMISSORY FRAUD IN ILLINOIS

THE GENERAL RULE IN ILLINOIS DENYING RECOVERY FOR THE
TORT OF PROMISSORY FRAUD

The generally accepted rule followed by most state courts 0 is that
a cause of action for promissory fraud allows equitable and legal
10. The following states recognize and accept promissory fraud as a tort cause
of action: Alabama: Russellville Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Frost, 484 So. 2d 1084 (Ala.
1986); Arizona: Correa v. Pecos Valley Dev. Corp., 126 Ariz. 601, 617 P.2d 767
(1980); Arkansas: Anthony v. First Nat'l Bank, 244 Ark. 1015, 431 S.W.2d 267
(1968); California: Tyco Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court 164 Cal. App. 3d 148, 211
Cal. Rptr. 540, (2d Dist. 1985); Colorado: Stalos v. Booras, 34 Colo. App. 252, 528
P.2d 254 (1974); Connecticut: Kavarco v. T.J.E., Inc., 2 Conn. App. 294, 478 A.2d
257 (1984); Delaware: Scott-Douglas Corp. v. Greyhound Corp., 304 A.2d 309 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1973); District of Columbia: Howard v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 432 A.2d 701
(D.C. 1981); Florida: Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So. 2d 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Idaho: Sharp v. Idaho Inv. Corp., 95 Idaho 113, 504 P.2d 386 (1972); Iowa: Hagarty
v. Dysart-Geneseo Community School Dist., 282 N.W.2d 92 (Iowa 1979); Kansas:
Modern Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Cinderella Homes, Inc., 226 Kan. 70, 596 P.2d
816 (1979); Kentucky: Kentucky Rd. Oiling Co. v. Sharp, 257 Ky. 378, 78 S.W.2d
38 (1935); Louisiana: Polusky v. Allstate, Petroleum, Inc., 180 So.2d 815 (La. Ct.
App. 1965); Maine: Forbes v. Wells Beach Casino, Inc., 409 A.2d 646 (Me. 1979);
Maryland: Ward Dev. Co., Inc. v. Ingrao, 63 Md. App. 645, 493 A.2d 421 (1985);
Minnesota: Bernstein v. Levitz, 218 Minn. 576, 16 N.W.2d 744 (1944); Missouri:
Hohenstreet v. Sterling Nat'l. Land Co., 706 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
Montana: Svennungsen v. Svennungsen, 165 Mont. 161, 527 P.2d 640 (1974);
Nebraska: Alliance Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. State Surety Co., 223 Neb. 403, 390
N.W.2d 487 (1986); Nevada: Bartsas Realty, Inc. v. Nash, 81 Nev. 325, 402 P.2d
650 (1965); New Hampshire: Munson v. Raudonis, 118 N.H. 474, 387 A.2d 1174
(1978); New Jersey: Lipsit v. Leonard, 64 N.J. 276, 315 A.2d 25 (1974); New Mexico:
Werner v. City of Albuquerque, 55 N.M. 189, 229 P.2d 688 (1951); New York:
Tribune Printing Co. v. 263 Ninth Avenue Realty, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 1038, 444 N.E.2d
35, 457 N.Y.S. 2d 785 (1982); North Carolina: Ferguson v. Ferguson, 55 N.C.App.
341, 285 S.E.2d 288 (1982); North Dakota: Lanz v. Naddy, 82 N.W.2d 809 (N.D.
1957); Ohio: Tibbs v. National Homes Const. Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369
N.E.2d 1218 (1977); Oklahoma: Tice v. Tice, 672 P.2d 1168 (Okla. 1983); Oregon:
Elizaga v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., Inc., 259 Or. 542, 487 P.2d 870 (1971); Pennsylvania: Brentwater Homes, Inc. v. Weibley, 471 Pa. 17, 369 A.2d 1172 (1977); Rhode
Island: Robinson v. Standard Stores, Inc., 52 R.I. 271, 160 A. 471 (1932); South
Carolina: Woodward v. Todd, 270 S.C. 82, 240 S.E.2d 641 (1978); South Dakota:
Reitz v. Ampro Royalty Trust, 75 S.D. 167, 61 N.W.2d 201 (1953); Texas: SpolIjaric
v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1986); Utah: Berkeley Bank for Coops.
v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980); Vermont: Union Bank v. Jones, 138 Vt. 115,
411 A.2d 1338 (1980); Virginia: Colonial Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Schneider, 228
Va. 671, 325 S.E.2d 91 (1985); Washington: Markow v. ABC Transfer & Storage
Co., 76 Wash. 2d 388, 457 P.2d 535 (1969); West Virginia: State v. Moore, 273
S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1980); Wisconsin: Hartwig v. Bitter, 29 Wis. 2d 653, 139 N.W.2d
644 (1966); Wyoming: Meyer v. Ludvik, 680 P.2d 459 (Wyo. 1984).
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relief for promises made without the present intent to carry them
out." In these cases, fraud is not premised upon the breach of the
agreement to perform, but the promisor's deceptive intent, the misrepresentation of a present intention to fulfill the promise where such
intent does not in fact exist 12 , and the deception of the other party by
the misrepresentation.' 3 This common law position was first enunciated by Lord Bowen in the landmark case of Edgington v. Fitzmaurice.' 4 This majority approach, followed by most states allows a cause
of action for promissory fraud and classifies a promise which the
promisor does not intend to perform as a misstatement of a material
fact.'5 Illinois takes the minority position and rejects, as a matter of
11. James-Dickinson Farm Mortg. Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119 (1920) (under

Texas law fraud may be established upon broken promises regarding future conduct
intended not to be kept by the defendant, and relied on by the defendant); Steiner
Bros. v. Slifkin, 237 Ala. 226, 186 So. 156 (1939) (promise made with present intent
not to keep it is sufficient for cause of action for fraud, even though the misrepresentation involved future conduct).
12. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Lunt, 82 Ariz. 320, 313 P.2d 393 (1957)
("fraud here complained of is not in the breach of the agreement to perform, but in
the implied representation of an existing intent to perform where such intent
is, in fact, nonexistent" (citing 23 Am. JUR. 887 (1939)); Sallies v. Johnson, 85 Conn.
77, 81 A. 974 (1911) (an action for deceit may be predicated upon a false promise to
do a future act which the promisor had no present intent to perform).
13. Pocatello Sec. Trust Co. v. Henry, 35 Idaho 321, 206 P. 175 (1922) ("false
representations as to future events will constitute fraud, where these events depend
upon the acts of the party making the representations, and form the inducement
whereby the other party is led into the transaction" citing Henderson v. San Antonio
R.R. Co., 17 Tex. 560,
, 67 Am. Dec. 675,
, (1856)); Polusky v. Allstate
Petroleum, Inc., 180 So. 2d 815 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (a fraud has been perpetrated
when a promise is made with no intention to perform and the other party relies on
said false promise).
14. 29 Ch. D. 459, 459-62 (1882) (Lord Bowen held directors liable to investors
for fraud because he recognized that a person's subjective intent is a material fact
upon which a fraud cause of action may lie). See also W. PROSSER, TI LAW OF
TORTS 728-29 (4th ed. 1971) (reaffirming the Bowen approach which classifies a
promise that the promisor does not intend to carry out as a misstatement of material
fact.)
15. Council v. Sun Ins. Office, 146 Md. 137, 126 A. 229 (1924) (a misrepresentation of the promisor's intent to perform is a misrepresentation of a material fact);
Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co., 185 N.C. 479, 117 S.E. 706 (1923) (a false
representation made by the promisor without the intent to carry it out is the
misrepresentation of an existing fact); Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153 Or. 354, 55
P.2d 1122 (1936) (essential element for fraud is a misstatement of an existing fact,
but a misrepresentation as to a man's state of mind is a misstatement of fact); Kritzer
v. Moffat, 136 Wash. 410, 240 P. 355 (1936) (a promise made by the promisor with
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law, the notion that a promisor can be sued in fraud for misrepresenting an intention to perform a promise in the future. 16 Illinois
courts conclude that, even without the present intent to keep the
promise, the promise is not a false representation of an existing fact 7
but rather an unexecuted intention 8 which does not establish a cause
of action for fraud. 9 The Illinois courts contend that the remedy in
20
these instances, if any, is to sue for breach of contract.
The Illinois rule, which denies as a matter of law an action for
promissory fraud, has been applied to various business deals and
personal affairs, 21 including promises implicating sales, purchases and
transfers of real property, 22 stock transactions,2 3 and miscellaneous
the present intent not to perform may be a misrepresentation of a subsisting fact,
and therefore a fraud).
16. States which do not recognize and accept promissory fraud as a tort cause
of action: Georgia: Gross v. Ideal Pool Corp., 181 Ga. App. 483, 352 S.E.2d 806
(1987); Hawaii: Aloha Petroglyph, Inc. v. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., 1 Haw. App.
353, 619 P.2d 518 (1980); Illinois: Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill.2d
320, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977); Indiana: Captain & Co., Inc. v. Stenberg, 505 N.E.2d
88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Michigan: Higgins v. Lawrence, 107 Mich. App. 178, 309
N.W.2d 194 (1981); Mississippi: House v. Holloway, 258 So. 2d 251 (Miss. 1972);
Tennessee: Fowler v. Happy Goodman Family, 575 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn. 1978). But
see Note, Promissory Fraud in Tennessee: A Wrong Without A Remedy, 10 MEM.

ST. U.L. REv. 308,'341 (1980).
17. Peterson Indus., Inc. v. Lake View Trust & Sav. Bank, 584 F.2d 166, 169
(7th Cir. 1978) (under Illinois law, ordinarily, an expression of opinion or a statement
concerning future events or expectations does not provide basis for an actionable
misrepresentation); People ex rel. Ellis v. Healy, 128 Ill. 9, 16, 20 N.E. 692, 694
(1889) (a promise to perform an act, does not constitute an actionable representation).
18. Roda v. Berko, 401 Ill. 335, 340, 81 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1948) ("the
representation must be an affirmance of fact and not a mere promise or expression
of opinion or intention" citing Luttrell v. Wyatt, 305 Ill. 274, 137 N.E. 95 (1922));
People ex rel. Ellis v. Healy, 128 Ill. 9, 16, 20 N.E. 692, 694-95 (1889) (unexecuted
intention itself does not constitute fraud).
19. See supra note 18.

20. See Hayes v. Disque, 401 Ill. 479, 82 N.E.2d 350 (1948) (remedy lies in suit
upon the promise); Miller v. Sutliff, 241 Ill. 521, 526-27, 89 N.E. 651, 652 (1909)
(mere breach of contract does not constitute fraud in law).
21. Murphy v. Murphy, 189 Il. 360, 59 N.E. 796 (1901) (promise to pay money
even though made without intention to perform); Van Sickle v. Harmeyer, 172 Ill.
App. 218 (1912) (promise by a divorced husband that he would see certain taxes were
paid and would redeem certain property).
22. Miller v. Sutliff, 241 Ill. 521, 89 N.E. 651 (1909) (failure of grantees of a
coal right to keep their agreements to move a large industry upon grantor's land,
build railroad, employ a large force of men, mine coal and deliver grantor's share in
exchange for deed, is not such a fraud as justifies setting aside the deed and canceling
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contracts and business proceedings. 24 This general rule which evolved

26
early in Illinois law 25 and which continues to exist today, is however,
subject to the exception which now becomes the focus of this article.

III.

INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF ScHEMEi EXCEPTION BY ILLINOIS
APPELLATE COURTS

Illinois Appellate decisions have articulated varied interpretations
to the meaning of the word "scheme" under the scheme exception to
in Illinois. 27
the general rule denying actions for promissory fraud
This note will now outline the development of this inconsistent
application of the scheme exception.
A.

THE BROAD APPLICATION

A number of Illinois appellate courts have interpreted the word
"scheme" broadly. 2s The leading case is the 1980 Fourth District
29
appellate case of Vance Pearson, Inc. v. Alexander. In Pearson, the
plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract as well as fraud
and deceit in the inducement. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant
promised to finish installation of plaintiff's truck scales on the
it as a cloud on title); Gold v. Vasileff, 160 Ill. App. 3d 125, 513 N.E.2d 446 (5th
Dist. 1987) (attorney's misrepresentation *concerning sellers''future compliance with
terms of sales agreement did not constitute the tort of fraud).
23. Ziskin v. Thrall Car Mfg. Co., 106 Ill. App. 3d 482, 435 N.E. 2d 1227 (1st
Dist. 1982) (stockholder not liable for erroneous judgment that merger would lead
to increased profits); Meixner v. Western Live Stock Ins. Co., 203 I11.App. 523
(1916) (false promise to resell within a certain time for first stock purchaser's benefit,
was not such a false representation for an action in fraud and deceit by such
purchaser to recover money paid in the purchase).
24. Gage v. Lewis, 68 Ill. 604 (1873) (promise of noncompetition by retiring
member of partnership was but an unexecuted intention, which does not constitute
fraud); Bank Computer Network Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co.,
110 Ill. App..3d 492, 442 N.E.2d 586 (1st Dist. 1982) (where bank promised to forego
collections until negotiations ceased, court held that breach of the promise states a
cause of action for promissory estoppel but not for promissory fraud).
25. See, e.g., Gage v. Lewis, 68 Ill. 604 (1873); People ex rel. Ellis v. Healy,
128 Ill. 9, 20 N.E. 692 (1889).
26. See, e.g., Madison Assocs. v. Bass, 158 Ill. App. 3d 526, 511 N.E.2d 690
(1st Dist. 1987) (future promises not actionable as fraud); Naiditch v. Shaf Home
Builders, Inc., 160111. App. 3d 245, 512 N.E.2d 1027 (2nd Dist. 1987) (promise of
future action accompanied with present intention not to perform is not misrepresentation upon which action for deceit can be based).
27. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
29. 86 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 408 N.E.2d 782 (4th Dist. 1980).
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plaintiff's farm by a specified date, knowing that he could not fulfill
the promise but intending plaintiff to rely on the promise to his
detriment.30 The court held that the defendant's misrepresentation
alone constituted an intended scheme to defraud plaintiff and was
actionable as fraud.3 The court expressed difficulty in distinguishing
between the general rule in Illinois which denies a cause of action for
fraud based on any future misrepresentations, and the exception to
the rule which makes misrepresentations actionable if it is the scheme
to accomplish the fraud.12 The court went on to state that the future
misrepresentations should be actionable as fraud because "misrepresentations are usually the schemes by which the victim is defrauded
regardless of whether the misrepresentation is as to the declarant's
future intent or otherwise."" Thus the court, by equating the single
false representation to be a "scheme" to defraud, allowed the exception to consume 4 much of the general rule in Illinois. In turn, this
lessened any distinction between the Illinois rule and tle majority
rule,35 followed in most states, which allows an action to lie for
promissory fraud. In this way, Pearson articulated a broad definition
to the word "scheme."
Pearson, and the other cases which follow its broad definition of
the word "scheme, 3 6 appear to be expounding upon an earlier
misapplication3 7 of the scheme exception by the Illinois Supreme Court
in the 1948 case of Roda v. Berko." In Roda, the plaintiff sued in
equity, requesting cancellation of a warranty deed because of a
fraudulent representation made by the grantee.3 9 The plaintiff had
relied on the defendant's fraudulent promise that he would use the

30. Id. at 1107, 408 N.E.2d at 783.
31. Id. at 1112, 408 N.E.2d at 787.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 6.
37. See, e.g., Roda v. Berko, 401 Ill. 335, 340, 81 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1948)
(acknowledging on one hand that a false promise to perform alone does not constitute
a cause of action in fraud, but still allowing equitable relief where a sole fraudulent
promise was the scheme or device to accomplish the fraud); Polelle, supra note 4, at
580-81. (stating that "although the Roda court's pronouncement of the scheme or
device exception appears to be based on a sound legal principle, the reasoning of the
decision is self-destructing because the only scheme or device in the case was the one
fraudulent promise").
38. 401 Ill. 335, 81 N.E.2d 912 (1948).
39. Id. at 337, 81 N.E.2d at 913.
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tract of land for factory purposes.4 The defendant, however, did not
build the factory as represented, but instead purchased the4 land for a
junkyard and thereafter used the property as a junkyard. 1
The defendant, relying on precedent of earlier cases, ' 2 contended
that no cause of action existed because of the general rule that a
promise to perform an act in the future, though made with the present
intention not to carry it out, was not an actionable representation
upon which to base a cause of action for fraud. 43 The Court rejected
the defendant's argument however, and held that the plaintiff had
sufficient existing grounds for stating a cause of action. The Supreme
Court, following the lead of earlier cases," held that whenever the
false representation is the scheme by which the fraud is accomplished
and through which another is defrauded out of his property, equitable
relief will be allowed and the parties will be45 restored to the positions
they held before the fraud was perpetrated.
But the Supreme Court in Roda misapplied the scheme exception
as the Court, in essence, was allowing an action for promissory fraud.
The scheme consisted of the single misrepresentation that the land
would only be used for factory purposes.4 The Court did not indicate
that the fraud and deceit was perpetrated through a systematic program for attaining the property in question. The Court, in Roda,
stated that a false representation to perform an act will not constitute
actionable fraud although made with a present intention not to carry
out the act. 47 Yet, the Court held that the single false representation
itself established a "scheme" to defraud, and allowed a cause of
action to lie under the scheme exception to the general rule. 48 In this
way, the scheme exception took on the appearance of a cause of
action for promissory fraud. Thus in the cases of Roda and Pearson,
we have the basis for those courts which hold that a false promise
40. Id. at 338, 81 N.E.2d at 914.
41. Id. at 339, 81 N.E.2d at 914.
42. Id. at 341, .81 N.E.2d at 915 (citing Gage v. Lewis, 68 I11.604 (1873);
People ex rel. Ellis v. Healy, 128 Ill. 9, 20 N.E. 692 (1889); Murphy v. Murphy, 189
I11.360, 59 N.E. 796 (1901); Bielby v. Bielby, 333 I11.478, 165 N.E. 231 (1929)). The
rule of law in Illinois is that a breach of a promise regarding future action is not
actionable as fraud.
43. Id. at 341-43, 81 N.E.2d at 915-16.
44. Id. at 340, 81 N.E.2d at 915 (citing Lutrell v. Wyatt, 305 I11.274, 137 N.E.
95 (1922); Abbott v. Loving, 303 Ill. 154, 135 N.E. 442 (1922)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 338, 81 N.E.2d at 914.
47. Id. at 340, 81 N.E.2d at 915.
48. Id.
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itself is a "scheme" as long as there is a false promise with no intent
to keep it, and intent for the plaintiff to rely on it.
B.

THE NARROW APPLICATION

In contrast to the preceding cases, several other Illinois appellate
courts have held the word "scheme" to a narrower interpretation, by
holding that a false promise itself with no intent to keep it is not
enough; there must be more facts to show a "scheme" to defraud. 49
One such case is the 1976 Second District appellate case of Zaborowski
5 0 In
v. Hoffman Rosner Corporation.
Zaborowski, the owners of
residences, purchased from the defendant land developer corporation,
brought an action alleging the existence of a fraudlent scheme, seeking
to enjoin the defendant from developing its remaining property for
other than single-family purposes or, alternatively, for damages.', The
appellate court held that no cause of action existed under the scheme
exception in Illinois because a single misrepresentation does not
constitute a sufficient basis for a cause of action for fraud.5 2 For a
cause of action for fraud to exist, it was not enough that a party
make a false promise with no intent to perform it. Rather, the total
facts had to evidence a scheme to defraud. 3 Unfortunately, the court
in Zaborowski did not expound upon what forms the essence of the
total facts test. Thus, we must look to other Illinois cases, as well as
federal diversity cases5 4 that have applied this test.
C. DEFINING A "SCHEME" TO DEFRAUD UNDER THE TOTAL FACTS
TEST

The following cases are helpful in extrapolating various facts that
are significant in defining a "scheme" to defraud. Various factors
which have been found to signify a "scheme" to defraud are: a series
49. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
50. 43 Ill. App. 3d 21, 356 N.E.2d 653 (2d Dist. 1976).
51. Id. at 22, 356 N.E.2d at 654.
52. Id. at 25, 356 N.E.2d at 656.
53. Id. The court went on to dismiss the allegation of fraud because fraud
must be specifically alleged and the court cannot permit conclusions of fact which
are not proven by reference to specific facts. Since the allegations did not contain
adequate specific facts to state all the necessary elements for a fraud cause of action,
the case was dismissed.
54. Federal cases are enlightening because they also interpret state substantive
law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (a federal court must follow
state common law decisions as well as state statutes and constitutional provision.
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56
of misrepresentations;" the scheme developed over a period of time;
and other conduct, not just the false promise itself. 7
The Illinois Supreme Court in Luttrell v. Wyatt,5" gives substance
to the total facts test by holding that a series of misrepresentations
was enough to constitute a "scheme" to defraud. In Luttrell, the
defendant deceived the plaintiff into loaning money to the defendant's
brother. 9 The plaintiff lent money to the defendant's brother based
upon various misrepresentations made to the plaintiff by the defendant. The defendant assured repayment of the loan if his brother
defaulted. The defendant represented that his brother owned property
which could be pledged as security on the loan. 6° The defendant's
brother defaulted, however the defendant did not follow through on
his promise of repayment. 6' After being threatened with grand jury
indictment, the defendant again misrepresented that he would repay
the plaintiff. 62 The defendant also made a number of other false
representations to the plaintiff. 63 The defendant represented that the
plaintiff's wife and son were not to be trusted in their counseling the
plaintiff to sue the defendant for repayment of the money. 64 The
defendant represented that they were after the money themselves. 65
The defendant, through these various misrepresentations, deceived the
plaintiff into releasing the existing contract action for nonpayment of
the debt. 66
The Supreme Court in Luttrell held for the plaintiff. The Court
found that the fraud, in this instance, consisted of a well-executed
scheme which was composed of repeated false promises to the plaintiff. 67 The defendant had repeatedly lied to the plaintiff in an attempt
to evade liability on the notes by promising repayment to the plaintiff
of all the money that he had loaned with interest. 6 The defendant
had also lied to the plaintiff regarding who had his best interests in

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See infra notes 58-77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
305 Ill. 274, 137 N.E. 95 (1922).
Id. at 276, 137 N.E. at 96.
Id.
Id.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 277, 137 N.E. at 96.

64. Id.
65. Id.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 283, 137 N.E. at 98.
68. Id. at 276, 137 N.E. at 96.
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mind. 9 The Court held that the plaintiff had executed knowingly and
understandingly the release, but it was executed in reliance upon
various misrepresentations that led the plaintiff to believe both that
the defendant repay the plaintiff the money he had loaned to the
defendant's brother and that the defendant was acting with the
plaintiff's best interests in mind. 70
This idea that a "scheme" consists of a number of false representations, rather than a single misrepresentation, was followed in
General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Central National Bank of
Mattoon.7' GMAC involved a fraud action brought by the automobile
company finance corporation against a bank. 72 The misrepresentation
upon which the cause of action for fraud and deceit was alleged,
occurred in a letter from a bank officer to the automobile company
finance corporation. 7 In response to GMAC's questionnaire concerning the financial stability of one of its dealerships, the letter stated
that the bank anticipated funds being received to cover a nonsufficient fund check from the dealership to the finance corporation. 74
This misrepresentation, however, was just one of a series of misrepresentations by the bank to the finance corporation. 7 The federal
court held that the letter constituted a scheme to defraud under
Illinois law, even though the letter predicted future events. 76 The court
held that the misrepresentation was not an isolated declaration, but a
part of a series of misrepresentations by the defendant. These misrepresentations worked to the defendant's advantage by allowing the
dealership to continue as a going concern so the bank could obtain
proceeds from the sale of vehicles by the dealership, in which sales
the bank had a security interest. 77
In the case of Willis v. Atkins, 78 the Illinois Supreme Court
allowed certain conduct besides promises to be used in defining a
"scheme" to defraud. Further, the Court in Willis stated that it is
essential that the fraud be perpetrated over a long period of time to
establish a "scheme" to defraud. 79
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 277, 137 N.E. at 96.
Id. at 280, 137 N.E. at 97.
773 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 774.
Id. at 777-78.

74. Id. at 778.

75. Id. at 775-78 (various misrepresentations occurred between January 12,
1979 and October 30, 1979).
76. Id. at 780.
77. Id.
78. 412 I11.245, 106 N.E.2d 370 (1952).

79. Id. at 258-59, 106 N.E.2d at 377.
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In Willis, the defendant promised to marry the plaintiff and leave
his wife if the plaintiff provided him with financial backing for his
funeral business.80 The plaintiff, relying on the defendant's representation to marry her after leaving his wife, transferred land and cash
8
to the defendant for operation of his funeral business. ' However, the
defendant did not follow up on his promise to leave his wife and
marry the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court in Willis held that the fraudulent scheme
exception applied. The Court stated that the fraud was perpetrated
upon the plaintiff by conduct as well as words and that this fraud
82
had been perpetrated over a long period of time. The defendant
perpetrated this fraud through frequent visits to the plaintiff, by
managing her business affairs, and by repeated attestations of his love
and affection for her.83 The Court parallelled the happenings in Willis
to the existence of a confidence scheme. The Supreme Court held that
a fraud existed because the fraud took place over a period of years,
and devices in addition to promises of future conduct were used to
secure defendant's confidence.8 4 Other conduct besides the promise
existed which assisted in perpetrating the fraud.
In sum, the total facts test may be described as conclusive proof
of a cause of action for fraud and deceit, where the total facts consist
of: (1) a series of misrepresentations by the defendant to the plaintiff;
(2) where the fraudulent scheme developed over a long period of time;
and (3) where other conduct, besides the false promise of future
conduct itself supplied a basis for the perpetration of the fraud.
D. IMPACT OF THE VARIED APPLICATION OF THE SCHEME
EXCEPTION TO THE LAW OF FRAUD IN ILLINOIS

The varied application creates confusion, offers no guidance for
courts or parties in this area of law and leads to irreconcilable results.
This lack of a uniform standard of application exists because the
courts are left with three viable options when confronted with an
allegation of fraud under the scheme exception to the general denial
of recovery for promissory fraud. The courts can (1) hold steadfast

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
N.E. 131

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
(1917)

249-51, 106 N.E.2d at 372-73.
259-60, 106 N.E.2d at 377.
258-59, 106 N.E.2d at 377 (citing People v. Miller, 278 Ill. 490, 116
and People v. Marek, 326 Ill. 11, 156 N.E. 772 (1927)).
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to the general rule which denies recovery for promissory fraud; 5 (2)
follow the broad definition of what constitutes a "scheme" to defraud
and hold that a false promise itself is a "scheme" as long as there is
a false promise with no intent to keep it, but intent for the plaintiff
to rely on it;6 or (3) follow the narrow definition of what constitutes
a "scheme" to defraud and hold that the promise itself with no intent
to keep it is not enough.17
This lack of uniformity has, in turn, created confusion in state
and federal courts8 attempting to apply the scheme exception, because
no guidance for these courts exists. These courts, especially the federal
courts, suggest that the varied Illinois case law is confusing and that
the Illinois courts have rarely made attempts at reconciling this
confusion and then only half-heartedly.8 9 Certainly the language 9°
which states the exception does not eradicate the confusion. In fact,
85. See, e.g., Serig v. South Cook County Serv. Corp., 581 F. Supp. 575 (N.D.
I11.1984) (under Illinois law, no promissory fraud cause of action for promises made
without the present intent to carry them out); Gross Valentino Printing Co. v. Clarke,
120 Ill. App. 3d 907, 458 N.E.2d 1027 (1st Dist. 1983) (a statement relating to
carrying'out of future events is not a basis for fraud).
86. See, e.g., Vance Pearson, Inc. v. Alexander, 86 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 408
N.E.2d 782 (4th Dist. 1980) (false promise to complete installation of truck scales on
farm plus plaintiff's reliance, constituted an intended scheme to defraud plaintiff);
Ronan v. Rittmueller, 105 11. App. 3d 200, 434 N.E.2d 38 (2d Dist. 1982) (false
promise to build plaintiff's house was deemed a scheme to defraud, based only upon
future promises made in bad faith and with deceptive intent).
87. See, e.g., Higgins v. Kleronomos, 121 I11.App. 3d 316, 459 N.E.2d 1048
(1st Dist. 1984) (false promise alone with no intent to keep it is not enough, need
more facts to show a scheme to defraud); Baker Bourgeois & Assocs. v. Taylor, 84
I11.App. 3d 909, 410 N.E.2d 55 (1st Dist. 1980) (false promise was not the equivalent
to total facts which show a scheme or device to defraud).
88. Two inconsistent federal approaches can be illustrative. Compare United
States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 999 (1964) (a scheme
to defraud may consist of promise as to future, when made with no intent to keep
it, but intent for the plaintiff to rely on it); with Classic Bowl, Inc. v. A.M.F.
Pinspotters, Inc., 403 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1968) (fraud in inducement cannot be based
upon future representations as to one's conduct).
89. See Hollymatic Corp. v. Holly Sys., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1366 (N.D. I11.
1985) (application of Illinois law in diversity action); Polelle, supra note 4, at 565-93
(for the general proposition that it is hard to find consistency in decisions applying
Illinois substantive law in this area).
90. Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 I11.2d 320, 334, 371 N.E.2d 634,
641 (1977) (even though the general rule in Illinois denies recovery for fraud based
upon a false representation of an intention to perform a promise in the future, a
recognized exception exists where the "false promise or representation of future
conduct is alleged to be the scheme employed to accomplish the fraud").
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this is how the confusion evolved-no where was the word "scheme"

adequately defined or promulgated.
This lack of uniformity allows the federal courts and the state
appellate courts to pick and choose the law they desire. In short,
court decisions appear to turn on an ad hoc weighing of the equities
which are controlled by the court's inclination, rather than clearly

defined principles. 91

Since this division of authority in which test to apply suggests no
uniformly-followed standards upon which to plead or defend a cause
of action for fraud and deceit, the parties themselves are also confused
in attempting to litigate this substantive area of the law. A clear

example of this confusion is represented by the case of Bank of

Lincolnwood v. Comdisco, Inc..92 In Comdisco, a lender sued a
borrower for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding an oral contract
to borrow money on discounted leases for equipment.9 3 The plaintiffs,
relying on Vance Pearson,94 contended that the general rule regarding
future promises as unactionable for fraud is no longer followed. 95 But
the Comdisco court held that this contention was without merit

because the general rule denying a cause of action for promissory

fraud to lie still applies. 96
This confusion may result when one tries to reconcile a holding
which says that a failure to perform some promise to do some act in
91. Hollymatic, 620 F. Supp. at 1369.
92. 111 I1. App. 3d 822, 444 N.E.2d 657 (lst Dist. 1982).
93. Id. at 824, 444 N.E.2d at 658.
94. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
95. Bank of Lincolnwood v. Comdisco, Inc., 111 Ill. App. 3d 822, 828-29, 444
N.E.2d 657, 661-62, (1st Dist. 1982) (citing George William Hoffman Co. v. Capital
Serv. Co., 101 Ill. App. 3d 487, 428 N.E.2d 600 (1st Dist. 1981) and Vance Pearson
v. Alexander, 86 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 408 N.E.2d 782 (4th Dist. 1980)). Bank asserted
that the general rule which denies a cause of action for promissory fraud, is no
longer followed.
96. Id. In the recent decision of Gold v. Vasileff, 160 Ill. App. 3d 125, 128,
513 N.E.2d 446, 448 (5th Dist. 1987), the court held that a "failure to perform a
promise to do some act in the future cannot be the subject of an action for fraud."
In Gold, the buyers and sellers contracted for the sale of a grocery business. Id. at
127, 513 N.E.2d at 447. The sellers' attorney prepared the contract. The sellers
backed out of the sale. Id. The plaintiffs (buyers) alleged that the defendant (attorney)
"promised and represented" to them that the sellers "would comply with the terms,
conditions, and agreements" of the agreement when he "knew or should have known
that the promises and representations were false and that the sellers would not
perform their obligations under the contract." Id. The Gold court, however, denied
a cause of action in tort to lie for fraud because "a misrepresentation about events
to occur in the future cannot constitute the tort of fraud." Id. at 128, 513 N.E.2d
at 448. "The representation must be to an existing or past fact." Id.
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the future cannot be the basis for an action for fraud under the
scheme exception, 97 with another which holds that a false promise

itself is a "scheme" to defraud, as long as there is a false promise
with no intent to keep it but intent for the plaintiff to rely on it, and
is therefore, actionable as fraud. 9 In both instances, the facts may be
identical. But in one court an action for fraud will lie, while in another
court, an action for fraud will not be allowed. 99 Thus a need exists
for a solution to this inequity in the law.
IV.

SOLUTIONS

The solution to this injustice is crucial because it will establish
the types of damages a plaintiff will be allowed to recover in these
causes of action. Punitive damages, generally, are not compensable
in suits for breach of contract.100 The remedy, in these situations, is
to sue upon the promise. Punitive damages are recoverable, however,
in circumstances where the breach of contract is the equivalent to an
independent tort and appropriate assertions of malice, wantonness,
388oppression exist.lol Therefore, the solution chosen will either restrict a plaintiff's recovery to compensatory damages for breach of
contract, or expand one's options of recovery by including punitive
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation.
A.

PROMISSORY FRAUD

Some authors would solve this inequity by allowing recovery for
promissory fraud in Illinois. 102 These authors would abolish the general
rule in Illinois which denies, as a matter of law, causes of action for
promissory fraud.10 3 They would also do away with the scheme
97. See supra note 7.
98. See supra note 6.
99. See Polelle, supra note 4, at 583 n. 135, citing Illinois Rockford Corp. v.
Kulp, 88 Ill. App. 2d 458, 232 N.E.2d 190 (1st Dist. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
41 111. 2d 215, 242 N.E.2d 228 (1968); Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).

100. See St. Ann's Home for the Aged v. Daniels, 95 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580, 420
N.E.2d 478, 481-82 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 85 Ill. 2d 575 (1981) and the cases
cited therein.
101. Id. (citing Wallace v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 12 Il. App. 3d 623, 299
N.E.2d 344 (5th Dist. 1973)).
102. See Polelle, supra note 4; see Prosser, supra note 13. See also generally W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 728-29 (4th ed. 1971).
103. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
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exception to the general rule. 1° They would allow a cause of action
for promissory fraud to exist in Illinois. A cause of action for fraud
would allow equitable and legal relief for promises made without the
present intent to carry them out. 105 This is the rule in the majority of
states' 06 and it would provide a clear-cut standard for the tort of
promissory fraud in Illinois. Advantages"07 to this solution also exist
outside of the basic remedies under contract law, such as the award
of punitive damages, which make promissory fraud an attractive
remedy for plaintiffs. But these factors do not necessarily mean that
this is the only, or the proper solution, to be adopted at this time.
B.

MISAPPLICATION

A long time ago, the Illinois Supreme Court held that, as matter
of law, a promisor could not be sued in fraud for misrepresenting an
intention to perform a future promise. 08s Some appellate courts in
Illinois, however, are misapplying the scheme exception to the aforementioned rule, in order to reach the result of allowing a cause of
action for promissory fraud. The appellate courts are basing their
holdings on an improper application of the scheme exception by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Roda v. Berko' °9 by purporting that a
"scheme" to defraud consists of a single misrepresentation." 10 Logic
and legal reason caution moving away from a longstanding rule of
law by basing a holding on a misapplication of the substantive law
of the state. These courts should base their contention on solid legal
precedent, rather than misapplication of the law in order to advance
their own personal feelings regarding the need to absolve specific
injustices."' It is also irrelevant that the facts of a certain case might

104. Polelle, supra note 4, at 578-93. (Illinois should allow a cause of action for
promissory fraud, especially in light of the inconsistent application of the scheme
exception).
105. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 10.
107. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 729 (4th ed. 1971). The tort remedy
for fraud presents critical advantages over any action on the contract itself, which
allows for restitution; such as recovery of the specific goods yielded in the transaction
as well as punitive damages.
108. See, e.g., Gage v. Lewis, 68 Il. 604 (1873); People ex rel. Ellis v. Healy,
128 Ill. 9, 20 N.E. 692 (1889).
109. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 28-48 and accompanying text.
111. Polelle, supra note 4, at 565-93. (the varied interpretation by the courts in
this area of the law has led to inconsistent and unjust results).
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establish a cause of action in another state. A cause of action for
promissory fraud simply does not exist in Illinois.
Illinois Appellate Courts that allow a cause of action by misapplying the scheme exception are not only circumventing the current
law but are also creating remedy problems. Following the broad
interpretation of the word "scheme" in Pearson, courts may award
punitive damages in a greater number of cases. The general rule as to
punitive damages is that they are not compensable in breach of
contract actions. "' 2 Illinois has long held that in a breach of contract
action, the plaintiff should be compensated through the award of
money damages." 3 This rule does not apply, however, in unusual
circumstances where the breach equals an independent tort, and
appropriate assertions of malice, wantonness, or oppression are present.11 4 In the exceptional cases, the added remedy of punitive damages
exists for the plaintiff. Therefore, the scope of the holdings, by
appellate courts following the broad definition of scheme in Pearson,
is crucial because if the majority opinion in Pearson is correct, then
the scheme exception has overwhelmed and consumed the general rule
denying recovery for promissory fraud, and plaintiffs are, in turn,
allowed greater opportunity to recover punitive damages than what
the substantive law supposedly allows. In this way, Pearson and other
decisions following it, by allowing recovery for punitive damages by
misapplication of the scheme exception, are eradicating the distinction
that lies between compensation under contract law, and punishment
under an award of punitive damages." 5 In these cases, the opportunity
112. See St. Ann's Home for the Aged v. Daniels, 95 Il1. App. 3d 576, 580, 420
N.E.2d 478, 481-82 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 85 Ill.
2d 575, (1981) and the cases
cited therein.
113. Vance, Pearson, Inc. v. Alexander, 86 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1114, 408 N.E.2d
782, 788 (4th Dist. 1980) (Webber concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Alsip
Homebuilders, Inc. v. Shusta, 6 Ill.
App. 3d 65, 284 N.E.2d 509 (1972)).
The theory behind this rule rests upon a distinction drawn between compensation and punishment. If the general purpose underlying the law of damages
is to promote security and prevent disorder, as Corbin points out, and
breaches of contract do not cause as much resentment or other physical or
mental discomfort as to wrongs called torts or crimes, then the remedies
needed to prevent breaches of contract and satisfy the injured party are not
as severe as those needed to punish the tortfeasor or criminal.

Id. at 69, 284 N.E.2d at 512.

114. St. Ann's Home for the Aged v. Daniels, 95 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580, 420

N.E.2d 478, 481-82 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 85 Ill.
2d 575 (1981) (citing Wallace
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 12 Ill. App. 3d 623, 299 N.E.2d 344 (5th Dist. 1973)).
115. Alsip Homebuilders, Inc. v. Shusta, 6 Ill. App. 3d 65, 69, 284 N.E.2d 509,
512 (1st Dist. 1972).
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to recover punitive damages exists solely because these courts hold
the tort of fraud to be based upon a single misrepresentation under
6
the scheme exception."
C.

APPLY THE TOTAL FACTS TEST OF ZABOROWSKI

This author believes that the scheme exception of Steinberg"7
should still be the law concerning a cause of action for promissory
fraud in Illinois. However, the scheme should be defined under the
total facts test of Zaborowski where a false promise itself with no
intent to keep it is not enough; there must be more facts to show a
"scheme" to defraud."' The Zaborowski test would provide guidance
in this presently ambiguous area of the law. In order to prove a cause
of action for fraud and deceit, a complainant would have to prove that
the total facts of his situation equal a "scheme" to defraud. A mere
promise should no longer be the equivalent of a "scheme" to defraud
which circumvents the general rule which denies recovery for promissory
fraud. Courts, by finding repeated broken promises,1"a misrepresentation over a long period of time,' 2° together with other surrounding
conduct, 2' would have a legitimate and a sufficient factual basis for
allowing recovery in tort under the scheme exception which, in turn,
allows the plaintiff the opportunity for recovery for punitive damages.
Zaborowski would also provide a middle-of-the-road solution to
the issues surrounding the two extremes presently existing in the law the general denial of recovery for promissory fraud versus the allowance
of a cause of action for promissory fraud. The Zaborowski test would
only punish those who really merit liability for punitive damages under
the tort of fraud and deceit by requiring a true "scheme" to define
the basis for recovery. The Zaborowski test compliments the pleadings
and proof requirements for fraud, 22 by requiring more than the mere
broken promise with intent not to keep it to be the basis for a cause
of action in fraud to lie under the scheme exception. The total facts
test ptovides a test for fraud which deletes reference and reliance upon

116. See supra notes 28-48 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 7, 49-53 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 58-77 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
122. Fraud must be specifically alleged and conclusions of fact must be supported
by reference to specific facts, therefore, the scheme exception should be pleaded with
facts supporting a true "scheme" to defraud, rather than a sole unbroken promise.
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the use of subjectivity, which is not acceptable in this area of law.' 23
Proof of fraud by other surrounding facts clearly reinforces the existence of intent by defendant to defraud and take advantage of the
plaintiff. It illustrates a systematic program for perpetrating the alleged
fraud.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School'24 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that even though the general rule in Illinois denies recovery
for fraud based upon a false representation of an intention to perform
a promise in the future, a recognized exception exists where the "false
promise or representation of future conduct is alleged to be the
scheme employed to accomplish the fraud."
Illinois courts, however, have not clearly defined what constitutes
a "scheme" to defraud. This lack of clarity has hindered delineation
of a precise standard for application of the scheme exception to the
general rule which has in turn, led to a varied application of the
scheme exception by Illinois appellate courts. The varied application
of the scheme exception has had a profound effect on the law of
fraud and deceit in Illinois. Court determinations appear to turn on
an ad hoc weighing of the equities which are controlled by the court's
inclination, rather than clearly defined principles. In one court an
action for fraud will lie, while in another court an action for fraud
will not be allowed under the same set of facts.
This author believes this inequity in the law should be solved by
applying the scheme exception according to the total facts test of
Zaborowski v. Hoffman Rosner Corporation. This would provide an
equitable solution to the two extremes presently existing in the lawthe general denial of recovery for promissory fraud versus the allowance of a cause of action for promissory fraud. The Zaborowski test
would allow opportunity for recovery against those who deserve
liability for punitive damages under the tort of fraud and deceit under
the scheme exception. It would allow liability under a true scheme
See Bank of Lincolnwood v. Comdisco 111 111. App. 3d 822, 444 N.E.2d 657 (1st
Dist. 1982); Zickur v. Irmiger, 15 I1. App. 3d 805, 304 N.E.2d 635 (2d Dist. 1973).
123. See, e.g., Kriegal v. Miedema, 20 Ill. App. 2d 235, 155 N.E.2d 815 (1959).

Fraud deals with a person's subjective intent which makes it easy for a plaintiff to

assert, but difficult for a defendant to disprove or a plaintiff to prove. Therefore, a
plaintiff should be able to point to specific objective facts which evidence fraud. The
allegation of the scheme to defraud provides this objectivity.
124. See supra note 2.
125. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 315 (Smith-Hurd 1987 Supp.), provides
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exception rather than allowing a "scheme" to consist of a single
misrepresentation. Moreover, it is consistent with the pleadings and
proof requirements for fraud, by requiring more than a single broken
promise with no intent to keep it to be a sufficient basis for a cause
of action for fraud under the scheme exception. The total facts test
deletes reference and reliance upon subjectivity, which is not acceptable in this area of the law.
This solution should be achieved under consideration and proper25
1
delineation of the word "scheme" by the Illinois Supreme Court.
Since the Illinois Supreme Court originated this problem by its inept
misapplication of the scheme exception in Roda v. Berko, the solution
should appropriately fall upon its shoulders. Therefore, the Illinois
Supreme Court should mandate use of the Zaborowski total facts test
and preclude the varied appellate application of the scheme exception
which presently exists under Illinois common law.
RAYMOND

R. NOLASCO

in pertinent part:
(a) Petition for Leave to Appeal; Grounds. Except as provided below for
appeals from the Industrial Commission division of the Appellate Court, a
petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the Appellate Court
may be filed by any party, including the State, in any case not appealable
from the Appellate Court as a matter of right. Whether such a petition will
be granted is a matter of sound judicial discretion. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons which will be considered: the general importance of the
question presented; the existence of a conflict between the decision sought
to be reviewed and a decision of the Supreme Court, or of another division
of the Appellate Court; the need for the exercise of the Supreme Court's
supervisory authority; and the final or interlocutory character of the judgment sought to be reviewed. However, no petition for leave to appeal from
a judgment of the five-judge panel of the Appellate Court designated to
hear and decide cases involving review of Industrial Commission orders shall
be filed, unless at least one judge of that panel files a statement that the
case in question involves a substantial question which warrants consideration
by the Supreme Court. A motion asking that such a statement be filed may
be filed as a prayer for alternative relief in a petition for rehearing, but
must, in any event, be filed within the time allowed for filing a petition for
rehearing.
Id. (Emphasis added). Under Supreme Court Rule 315, grounds are illustrated which,
"while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons which will be considered." Id. One of these grounds, which this
case clearly falls under, is the "existence of a conflict between the decision sought to
be reviewed" and a decision of "another division of the Appellate Court." Id. The
Panel, which reviews the petitions to appeal, would have to recognize this existing
conflict of standards as a substantial issue warranting resolution by the Illinois
Supreme Court.

